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1. To the foreign student of political thought, the American intellec
tual landscape contains an unexpected feature—the Constitution. That
the Constitution should be a fundamentally important element in
political practice is unsurprising, even if, to the foreigner, the way in
which the Constitution enters may at times seem strange. But that the
Constitution should be fundamentally important in political thought is a
quite different matter. Yet the foreigner may and should reflect that, to
its founders, the United States is a nation founded in revolution, not
only in the actual circumstances of its birth, but also, and more
importantly, in the idea which informs it. That idea, expressed in the
Declaration of Independence, is that "Governments ... [derive) their
just Powers from the Consent of the Governed." The Constitution not
only affirms this idea in its opening words, but applies it in the
institutions and rights it determines. The Constitution, then, is to be
read, not merely as defining a particular political practice, but as
defining aform—indeed, in its time, a new form—of political practice, in
which the powers of government are legitimate because they are
established through and limited by the consent of "We, the People."
But how does the Constitution define a new form of political
practice? Frank Michelman began a recent lecture with the claim, "In
American constitutional argument the premise is standard, if often tacit,
that all legitimate authority, hence all law, is ultimately traceable to a
popular will."1 Towards the end of the lecture he said, "In the
American constitutional understanding—to take up, now, where I
began—the thought is inescapable that the Constitution's authority, as
judicially enforceable higher law, derives from its popular origin as
"our" law." (M.) Between those two statements lies at least part of the
problem I want to address. How does the Constitution come to be, not
merely the embodiment, but the privileged embodiment, of the popular
will? How does it come to be binding higher law?
The Constitution stands in a dual relation to popular will. It is
•Earlier versions of this lecture havebeen presented as partof theJohn M. Olin program
in normative political economy at Duke University, and to the Society for Ethical and
Legal Philosophy. I am grateful for the discussion on those occasions. I also want to thank
ChristopherMorris forhis comments on the initialversion, andJamie Titus forher advice
throughout.
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expressive of that will; only so does it have authority. But it is also
constitutive of that will. The Constitution determines what shall and
shall not be expressive of popular will. And so we find ourselves asking,
not only why the Constitution should have any authority—why we
should see it as embodying the popular will—but why it should have the
higher authority of defining the popular will, or of being, as we might
say, its constitutive expression. I want to approach this question in the
light of a distinction Michelman makes in elucidating constitutional
argument, between deliberative and strategic politics.
"Deliberative politics connotes a reasoned interchange among persons
who recognize each other as equal in authority and entitlement to
respect, jointly directed towards answering some questions of public
ordering ... all remain open to the possibility of persuasion by others
and ... a vote, if any vote is taken, represents a pooling of judgments.
Strategic interaction ... appeals to one another's several self-interests by
conditional offers of cooperation and forbearance ... Strategic outcomes,
whether formally embodied in votes or in contracts, or just informally
carried out in social behaviors, represent not a judgment of reason but a
vector-sum in a field of forces." (M.) I have made one significant
alteration in Michelman's characterization of deliberative politics, in
omitting reference to the constraints of "justice, right, and the common
good" which he imposes on the reasoned interchange. Michelman's
characterization treats these as exogenous to a reasoned interchange; I
shall claim rather that a concern with justice and the common good are
ensured by the very idea of such an interchange, properly conceived.
Michelman argues that to treat the constitution as binding higher
law requires that we consider constitutional law-making as deliberative,
rather than strategic. "If the Constitution is just another strategic
political power play, why would or should we feel in the least bound by
its authority?" (M.) But if this points to an explanation of why we
consider the Constitution binding, it does not yet suggest why we
consider it binding higher law. And here, we must invoke the idea that
ordinary law-making—let us say legislative politics—typically rests on a
strategic power play. The Constitution affords the perspective of deliber
ation, of reasoned judgement about the public ordering, for evaluating
the day-to-day decisions taken about particular aspects of that ordering.
If we were confident that these day-to-day decisions were themselves
deliberatively reached, we should have no need of higher law.
2. My primary concern is to explore the deliberative/strategic
distinction as a clue to understanding the role of a constitution in
political interaction. So let us ascend, or at least abstract, from actual to
ideal political interaction. And letusbegin byconsidering thepresump
tion against the justificatory force of strategic interaction which under
lies Michelman's defence of the constitution as higher law. I want to
ask—why deliberative politics? Why not accept the fruits of strategic
interaction—interaction in which each person advances his or her own
interests? The paradigm of successful strategic interaction is, of course,
the market. Each advances her own interests, and the result ismutually
beneficial—no one could do better without someone else doing worse.
The market shows us the workings of Adam Smith's Invisible Hand.
But the harmony of the market is neither natural nor universal. A
market-like structure emerges only in the absence of opportunities for
force and fraud; it succeeds only in the absence of occasions for free-
riding, for escaping or displacing costs. Force, fraud, and free-riding are
the ills that blight the fruits of strategic interaction.
Politics may now appear asthe remedy for those ills. We may appeal
here to the view ofJames Buchanan, who distinguishes the protective
state, which seeks to eliminate coercion and deception from the relations
ofhuman beings, from the productive state, which aims at the cooperative
provision of those public goods that are inefficiently realized in market
competition because offree-riding possibilities for evading ordisplacing
costs.2 One way of characterizing this view of the role of politics is to
represent it as making possible market success (byeliminating force and
fraud), and remedying market failure (by eliminating free-riding). But
the reference to market success and market failure might misleadingly
suggest the subordination of the political realm to the economic. I am
not proposing that we think of persons as concerned exclusively or
necessarily even primarily withwhat are normally considered economic
goods, so that they would view politics simply as instrumental to their
economic ends. The rationale of politics is to supplant or constrain
strategic interaction, whenever, left to itself, it would result in an
outcome that although individually stable would be mutually disadvan
tageous—stable, in that no person can benefit by unilaterally changing
herbehavior, butdisadvantageous, in thatall persons could benefit were
each to change her behavior. This failure represents the fundamental
structural problem in interaction. It can arise whenever different
persons value outcomes differently—whenever our conceptions of the
good may lead us toopposed evaluations ofthe possible outcomes ofour
interaction. We need not be economic men—or economic women—
identifying our good with the size ofour individual commodity-bundle,
to face the problems of strategicinteraction, and to need the remediesof
politics.
Consider, then, persons whoseconceptionsof the good lead them, in
the absence of constraints, into mutually disadvantageous interaction.
We need assume no deep hostility or conflictamong these persons. To be
sure, such conflict is possible—as between two persons, castaways on a
very small and ill-favored island, each rightly viewing the presence of
the other as a threat to his own survival. In these unfortunate
circumstances, strategic interaction may result in a conflict assuredly
fatal to one if not both of the persons; the logic is that of Hobbes's
natural condition of humankind. Each may recognize this conflict to be
disadvantageous, not only to himselfbut to his fellow, and yet peace may
escape them. And the best they can even hope for is an uneasy truce. I
mention this situation only to contrast it with the very different context
that invitespolitics—the contextof personseach of whom welcomes the
presence of the others as potential participants in, to borrow Rawls's
useful phrase, "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage," (R. p. 4)3
but who recognizes also that individual differences in the evaluation of
possible outcomes threaten to deprive each of the fruits of such a
venture, and to do so despite each person's best efforts to advance her
own interests. These persons seek, not only to avoid the costs of
interference that even enemies might wish to avoid, but to gain the
benefits that may be realizedfrom the complementarity of resources and
the division of labor. For such persons, and only for such persons, is
there a political good.
I have contrasted two contexts of interaction; we should, however,
considerthe possibility of passage fromone to the other. The interaction
of those who would prefer not to interact, each of whom regards the
presence of the others as a cost, may, in the most favorable circum
stances, result in a modus vivendi. Now it may be that, having acquiesced
in such a situation, the participants come over time to regard it
differently, to realize that the others afford opportunities as well as
imposing costs. The others are, if not yet welcome, nevertheless useful,
their presence accepted and not merely and grudgingly tolerated.
Persons who were once enemies, now find themselves allies. At first,
their only bonds are those of convenience. And if opportunities for
mutual benefit are seen to arise only in limited areas of life, and to be
restricted to activities that are valued merely instrumentally, then the
bonds between persons may remain ones of mere convenience. But as
wider opportunities for mutual benefit come to be appreciated, so that
each views her fellows as sharing in a way of life, then, provided that
each finds those fellows willing to ensure that her placein their activities
isa fair and reasonableone, they cometo be seen as public friends, their
presence now welcomed rather than merely accepted. What were bonds
of convenience become ties of mutual civic concern.
3. Public or civic friendship is a key idea in my discussion. It
expresses a distinctive form of concern with other persons, which is
neither instrumental nor affective, although it does not exclude either or
both of these. Civic friends need feel no emotional attachment to the
good of their partners, but they affirm each other's good in willingly
making and honoring whatever commitments are needed to make their
mutual activities successful from each partner's perspective. To be sure,
a merely instrumental partnership already requires agreement to con
strain or redirect the strategically rational actions of each partner
towards their mutual benefit. Civic friendship does not supplant this
need, but supplements it with the further demand that the agreement
assure equal respect.4 Each ofthepartners retains herownconception of
the good; their friendship requires, not that each submerge heridentity
and her aims in the common cause of a collective, but rather that each
respect the identity and aims of her fellows, willingly according them
equal place in their common affairs with her own. The more each feels
secure in the place accorded by her fellows, the more each seeks to
secure them in their places. To bring about this security, then, the
partners face the task ofdesigning institutions and practices that are the
visible sign of their intention of friendship, so that by structuring their
interaction ina way that manifests their mutual regard, they ensure that
their friendship will endure. I shall, for convenience, speak ofthe design
of appropriate institutions and practices as the formation of a constitu
tion to regulate the interactions of persons regarded now as members of
a society.
The constitution represents a shared good among the members of
the society. This is to be understood in two related but distinct ways.
First, in making possible cooperation and preventing unreasonable
interference, it enables each better torealize his own good than would be
possible in the "state of nature" characterized by universal strategic
interaction. But second, and again in making possible cooperation and
preventing interference, it enables each to express his friendship in
performing actions that further the good ofhis fellows, and inrefraining
from other actions that would diminish their good. Thus persons are
enabled to advance their own aims and interests in ways that exhibit
respect for theaims and interests ofeach. I shall say that thisconstitutes
the political good. It is possible only for persons who view each other as
welcome partners in cooperative interaction, and it is realized by
creating the conditions under which they can translate that welcome into
practice.
Beginning with persons, each with his or her own conception of the
good, who recognize that these distinct conceptions of the good create
the possibility that individual rational strategic behavior will be mutu
ally costly, I have narrowed my focus to exclude those for whom the very
presence of their fellows is itself a source of disadvantage. I have
supposed that those who first see others as useful will, as they share a
wider range of activities, come to see those others as companionable,
and will seek ways to regulate their interaction to secure mutual benefit
and express mutual respect. These ways are embodied in their constitu
tion. Note that this constitution expresses no good of its own; there is, or
at least need be, no communal good beyond what arises from the
individual goods of the members of society.5 The idea is that the
constitution should bring about those conditions that are optimally
responsive to these individual goods, which are left quite open; each
member of society is free to form and to carry out a life plan of her own.
The only, but crucial, principled constraint imposed on each person's
plan is that it be compatible with her receiving and being received by her
fellows in welcome partnership.
4. I come now to the idea of deliberative politics. Let me quote again
Michelman's characterization: "a reasoned interchange among persons
who recognize each other as equal in authority and entitlement to
respect, jointly directed towards answering some question of public
ordering." (M.) The primary question of public ordering is to be
answered by the constitution; what are the optimal conditions under
which the members of a society may interact for their mutual advantage
and to express their equal respect? How shall this question be answered?
My concern here is, not to determine the answer, but to ascertain the
method—the way in which one might arrive at an answer. And my
suggestion is that we consider the primary question of public ordering as
itself addressed to the public who stand to benefit from the ordering.
The content of this question embraces all of the interactions of the
members of society. But addressing this question to the public introduces
a particular interaction taking as outcome a public answer. How shall this
interaction be ordered? It might seem that we are faced with a circle—
that we must know how social interaction may best be ordered so that we
may best order the particular social interaction required to provide a
public answer to the question how social interaction may best be
ordered. But, I suggest, this is not the case. The conditions for optimally
ordering the particular interaction required to answer the question of
optimal public ordering, may be made directly explicit by reflecting on
the two standards that the ordering must satisfy—the standards of
mutual advantage and equal respect.
We think then of a reasoned interchange. A deliberative politics is
characterized procedurally. The appropriateness of the answers it yields
to public questions is established, not by any appeal to assumed
expertise, but by the assurance that the manner in which it is conducted
is informed by the standards that the answer must satisfy. It begins from
a question about the public ordering that all want answered, because the
answer establishes standards or conditions of interaction from which all
benefit, in relation to the benchmark set by individual strategic choice.
It seeks an answer to which all can agree, since it is reached from a
debate in which each is able, freely and fully, to offer his reasoned
judgment under rules that treat no person as privileged and no answer
as presumptively favoured. The pressure to reach agreement arises
solely from its desirability, which is felt equally by the members of
society, and not from any differences in capacity or temperament or
position, which might bear differentially on the members, and so benefit
some at the expense of others. Since each is able to present his reasoned
judgment, each is able to ensure that the mutual advantage realized in
the answer embraces his own good. Since no one is privileged, each is
able to ensure this only by equally embracing the good of his fellows,
and so demonstrating his equal respect for them and their endeavours. A
reasoned interchange, in which all seek an answer to which all must
agree, results in unanimity. The procedure of deliberative politics is thus
informed by the standards that its outcome must satisfy. Through
deliberative politics, therefore, we are able to provide the public answer
demanded by the primary question of optimal public ordering.6
5. I mentioned previously that in characterizing a deliberative
politics, I altered Michelman's account by omitting the requirement
that the reasoned interchange give an answer compatible "with the
dictates ofjustice, right, and the common good." (M.) It is now time to
bring these elements in to my account. We give content to both justice
and the common good by establishing a constitution through the
proceduresofdeliberative politics. Consideredas structuring interaction
to promote, or to enable the promotion of, mutual advantage, the
institutions established in the constitution embody the common good.
The recognized authority of these institutions is an important compo
nent of public capital. The value of this public capital is, of course, to be
measured by its enhancement of the individual goods of the members.
The attainment of supposed national objectives, not themselves found in
the equal recognition of these individual goods, is no part of the
common good as I am characterizing it.
Considered as structuring interaction to exhibit, or to ensure the
exhibition of, full and equal respect for persons, the institutions
established in the society embody justice. In requiring that agreement
on these institutions be reached through a reasoned interchange,
deliberative politics offers each person the opportunity to advance
whatever proposal he pleases, but requires him to submit it to the critical
consideration of his fellows, so that its adoption depends on his being
able to give it a reasoned grounding that must either speak equally to the
life-plans of all of the participants, or establish the parity of the proposal
with similar and compatible proposals that, taken together, reflect
equally their several life-plans. Thus no one, after giving his consent,
has any basis for complaining that he was unable either to advance or to
defend his concerns in ways available to any of his fellows. Now I take
this to ensure the ex ante fairness of the institutions chosen. But the ideal
of justice manifested in such a choice is essentially negative. It is, we
might say, the justice of mutual convenience—of relationships among
persons who, in Rawls's useful phrase, "are conceived as not taking an
interest in one another's interests." (R. p. 13) This is essentially the
weak conception of justice I develop in Morals by Agreement and else
where, representing "the virtue of the self-interested ... that curbs self-
interest."7 But I said earlier that, beginning from relationships of
convenience, if each of the participants can see her share ofbenefits to be
a fair and reasonable one, then the others may come to be no longer
merely accepted but instead regarded as friends, and so as persons in
whom one takes an interest. If, as I am supposing, a constitution is an
affirmation of civic friendship, and not a mere treaty or compact of
alliance, then we may expect the ideal of justice it embodies to require,
not merely equitable opportunities for individuals to advance their own
life-plans, but a positive affirmation of those life-plans as equally and
fully entitled to the support of society. Since civic friendship does not rest
on or require personal affection, this conception of justice is compatible
with a purely personal indifference among individuals, but it reflects and
requires a positive political or civic concern of each for his fellows.
The unanimist procedure of deliberative politics may remind us of
Rawls's idea of choice in the original position. But for Rawls, unanimity
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is reached through subordinating the differences among persons to the
veil of ignorance, rather than by coordinating those differences in
mutual agreement. And Rawls distinguishes the choice of the principles
of justice from the choice of a constitution; he supposes that the latter
proceeds "subject to the constraints of the principles of justice." (R. p.
196) He insists, "In framing a just constitution I assume that the two
principles of justice already chosen define an independent standard of
the desired outcome. If there is no such standard, the problem of
constitutional design is not well posed." (R. p. 198) In subordinating
the choice of a constitution to that of principles of justice, Rawls's
account differs markedly from the one I have developed. As I have
characterized deliberative politics, principles of justice are not the
subject of a prior or independent choice, and constitutional choice is not
subjected to any principled constraint established by prior choice. The
exception that the constitution will promote mutual advantage and
manifest equal respect is assured directly by the manner in which it is
chosen.
My claim is that the outcome of deliberative politics is constitutive of
justice among individuals. Concretely, a constitution may be said to
constitute the political institutions of a society; abstractly, it may be said
to constitute justice and, as we have seen, the common good. Rawls
says, "Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what
constitutes his good, ... so a group of persons must decide once and for
all what is to count among them as just and unjust." (R. pp. 11-12) I
shall comment on "once and for all" presently. Here my concern is with
the decision on what is to count as justice. In identifying that decision
with the choice of a constitution, I emphasize the idea that a constitution
is legally foundational as the privileged act of popular will. Behind the
popular will expressed in the constitution are only the particular and
multifarious goods expressed in the life-plans of the individual members
of society.Justice can not be found by mere reflection on them. But from
our awareness of the costs of strategic interaction based on these life-
plans, we face the question of an optimal public ordering; the answer is,
in effect, the determination of what is to count as just and unjust.8 In
giving this answer constitutional status, we represent it as a single,
shared, public understanding.
6. I have developed the idea of deliberative politics as a constraint on
strategic interaction. But as I recognized at the outset, within politics
itself there is a strategic dimension, so that the day-to-day workings of
the political system may be seen as exhibiting the very form of behavior
that, I have claimed, the deliberative politics of the constitution exists to
control and redirect. And we may find this view of strategic politics
expressed in American Constitutional thought, which, as Michelman
notes, accepts "the doctrine that treats state-based power as more
dangerous than market-based power," and does this, he argues, because
of "a vision of the public, political process of regulatory law-making as
predominantly strategic rather than deliberative in character." (M.)
The Constitution9 addresses, from the deliberative standpoint, the
politics of later society, and finds it wanting. Thus the Constitution
strictly limits this politics.
To understand the relation between deliberative and strategic pol
itics, I shall first focus again on the relation between the two modes of
interaction. In strategic interaction, each person seeks directly to
advance her own good. Agreements are made, and kept, to the extent to
which they are perceived to be maximally beneficial from each agent's
perspective. Now one might think of deliberative interaction in the way
in which Rawls describes R.B. Perry's account: as maximally "promot
ing the ends reached by reflective agreement under circumstances
making for impartiality and good will." (R. p. 148) Agreement then is
not limited to a coincidence of what is maximally beneficial from the
differing perspectives of individuals. This may seem to correspond to the
idea of "a reasoned interchange among persons who recognize each
other as equal in authority and entitlement to respect." Impartiality and
good will are implicit in the idea, underlying my argument, of persons
as "welcome partners in cooperation."
Rawls's criticism of Perry, insofar as it is relevant to our concerns,
turns on identifying good will with "a benevolent concern for one
another's interests," (R. p. 141) and supposing that this makes an
account ofagreement unmanageably complex. But whether or not this is
a fair criticism of Perry, in relating good will to civic friendship I
understand its role rather differently. I do not suppose that good will
requires persons to be personally benevolent, or to take any interest, as
individuals, in the interests of others, although of course it is compatible
with and perhaps even conducive to taking such interest. Rather, I
understand good will as involving openness and good faith—the willing
ness to acknowledge the nature and strength of one's true concerns in
the process of reaching agreement, and the subsequent willingness to
adhere or keep to whatever is agreed. Within the framework of
agreement, each must exhibit a positive concern for impartiality and
mutuality.
In deliberative interaction persons may, and must be expected to,
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seek to advance their own good. The reasoned interchange that it
demands should be understood, not as opposed to the mode of strategic
interaction, but rather, I suggest, as an idealized form of the "condi
tional offers of cooperation and forbearance" that Michelman considers
strategic. Here I appeal to one of the main themes of Morals by Agreement.
Under full information, the factors that lead ordinary bargaining to fall
short of a reasoned interchange are absent. I say in my book, "In
ordinary bargaining persons may conceal significant features of their
circumstances, or the full range of their options, may misrepresent their
preferences, or the strengths of their preferences. ... In ordinary
bargaining persons may bluff, especially if they are also able to conceal
or misrepresent factors, so that others have uncertain or mistaken
expectations about what the bluffers arc willing to do. ... In ordinary
bargaining persons may make threats, but among fully rational persons
threats are useless; no one will believe anyone who claims that he will act
in a non-utility-maximizing way should others not comply with this
threat, and to say that one will act in a utility-maximizing way is not to
threaten. Our bargainers have no psychological strengths to exploit, or
psychological weaknesses to be exploited. And we assume that... no one
need come to a decision without full consideration; bargaining is
unpressured. Thus each bargainer can employ only his own rationality
to appeal to the equal rationality ofhis fellows. In addition to rationality,
there are only each person's preferences and possible actions to consider,
and it is about these that everyone bargains."10 We regard each
bargainer as serving as an ideal representative of the particular person
he will be in the social world to be shaped by the constitution on which
all agree."
Deliberative agreement may thus be treated as strategic bargaining
under full information, in circumstances designed to remove the effects
of all differential pressures and capacities on reaching agreement.12
Michelman's claim that "strategic outcomes ... represent not a judg
ment of reason but a vector-sum in a field of forces" offers a false
dichotomy; reason and force coexist in all human interaction. For force
is the exercise of power, and without power, defined by Hobbes as an
agent's "present means, to seek his future apparent good,"13 there
would be no place for practical reason, for deliberation on using one's
power to attain that good.
7. Deliberative politics, however, demands a closer characterization
in relation to strategic interaction. For we may say that in deliberative or
constitutional politics, human beings seek, through an appropriately
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conditioned strategic interaction, to direct and constrain their future
interaction, which they anticipate to be largely strategic. They seek to
remedy the failure of strategic interaction to yield outcomes affording
fair mutual advantage. I want to distinguish and focus on two parts of
this remedy. The first addresses the mode of decision. In pure strategic
interaction, outcomes result from the independent decisions of individu
als. There is no social decision determining a social outcome. Under
some circumstances, of which the perfectly competitive market is our
favored example, this decentralized mode of decision-making proves
efficient, and leads to outcomes in which individual benefits are
proportionate with individual costs. But where this natural harmony of
interests is lacking, we may seek a centralized mode of decision-making
that will bring about an artificial harmony. In a democratic society, the
choice of this mode becomes itself the object of interaction among
individuals. We seek then a decision-making institution, within which
individuals may be expected to interact in strategically rational ways,
but which structures their interaction so that its product—the social
decision—yields a fair and optimal state of affairs. Such an institution
may be envisaged as arising from unanimous agreement, since it is
acceptable, and equally acceptable, to all. Each sees the opportunity for
advancing her interests commensurately with those of her fellows in
determining the decisions of society.
Typically, this institution—the primary institution of government
itself—is largely majoritarian, as seems practically necessary if it is to
combine efficacity with democracy. But any majoritarian decision
procedure poses a constant danger to the unanimist foundations of the
constitutional order. For if persons are bent on strategic behavior, then
chance alone will almost surely give some opportunities for exploiting
the procedure of majoritarian decision to gain benefits while displacing
some costs, which of course entails that others pay costs without gaining
compensating benefits. If we focus exclusively on the dangers of
majoritarian decision, we may be led to impose severe constitutional
restraints on its scope, and so on the scope of governmental authority.
We shall leave large areas of society to the decentralized decision-making
represented by free individual interaction. But to restrain government
in these areas is in effect to unleash the market, and insofar as
government serves as a remedy for the failure of the strategic interac
tions characteristic of the market, to restrain government is in effect to
accept a greater measure of market failure without remedy. To be sure,
we do not want the power of government to extend to interference with
market success. We do not want to replace the strategic interaction of free
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individuals, in those circumstances in which they are able to achieve
optimal outcomes in which benefits are matched to costs, with the
strategic interaction of an unrestricted majoritarian politics, which can
by no means be expected to yield either optimal or fair outcomes. In
effect then, we want to achieve a constitutional balance between two
modes of strategic activity—market and government.
The second part of the political remedy concerns, not so much the
mode of decision—individual or social, but the mode of reasoning. Here
I may usefully quote Thomas Hobbes, while recognizing that he is not to
be understood as a recruit to constitutionalism. In replying to Bishop
Bramhall, Hobbes says, "because neither mine nor the Bishop's reason
is right reason fit to be a rule of our moral actions, we have therefore set
up over ourselves a sovereign governor, and agreed that his laws shall be
unto us, whatsoever they be, in the place of right reason, to dictate to us
what is really good."14 Law, for Hobbes, provides a public reason,
authoritative over the private reason of each individual. Hobbes's
account of the need for public reason is a version, albeit an extreme
version, of the general argument I have given in support of deliberative
politics—unconstrained strategic interaction among individuals, in
which each is guided by his own reason, leads to that most awful of
strategic failures, the war of all against all. But we need accept neither
his dismal vision, nor his insistence on a "sovereign governor," to adapt
Hobbes's thought about law to my purpose.
Throughout my discussion, I have taken unconstrained and unstruc
tured strategic interaction among persons as a base line. Now we may
think of law as affecting that interaction in two very different ways. On
the one hand, we may think of law as structure. This is how I have
understood a constitution, as providing a framework for social decision
in those areas in which, even if we assume that individuals interact
strategically within the social framework, the outcome is likely to be
mutually more advantageous than if matters are left to individual
decision. But on the other hand, we may think of law as constraint. We
may think of law as specifying a standard of reasonable conduct for each
member of society, based on what those members would deliberatively
acknowledge. Each then is expected to curb the pursuit of her own
interests to conform to the requirements of law, and to do so because the
law derives from a reasoned interchange to which she is party. It is in
this sense that we may understand the lawas a standard ofpublic reason,
overriding the exercise of private judgment and directing persons to
their mutual advantage, and we may agree with Hobbes that "this right
reason, which is the law, is no otherwise certainly right than by our
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making it so by our approbation of it and voluntary subjection to it. "I5
My claim, then, is that the law is entitled to serve this constraining role
because its authority derives from the deliberative politics of constitu
tion-making, which finds its expression in the idea of "We, the People."
8. And in returning to the people I return from my abstract
discussion of ideal politics. I must ask whether my argument has any
application to the real political and legal realms. I face an obvious
objection: does not my entire argument gain the appearance of rele
vance by deliberately confusing an ideally reasoned interchange with a
particular set of political events? I have defended the claim that a
constitution would be justifiably enforceable as higher law, were it the
product of an exercise in deliberative politics—of a reasoned interchange
among persons in circumstances sufficient to afford each the expectation
of mutual advantage and equal respect. But can any actual constitution
be represented as the product of reasoned interchange? Can any actual
political or judicial decision be shown to be justifiably enforceable, by
representing them as made in accordance with procedures that are the
outcome of reasoned interchange?
There is a further problem—the problem of binding posterity.
Suppose that we could defend an actual constitution as the product of a
real-world approximation to a reasoned interchange. We might then
suppose that its provisions might justifiably be enforced over the parties
to the agreement. But if, as with the American Constitution, the
reasoned interchange took place two hundred years ago, then why may
its provisions be justifiably enforced on Americans today? The preamble
speaks of "our posterity," but how is posterity brought within the
Constitution's scope? How can the Constitution be chosen "once and
for all?"
These are familiar problems with attempts to offer a contractarian
understanding of a political system. Such an understanding requires
more than showing that actual political and judicial institutions and
practices, or the particular decisions to which they give rise, are those
that would follow, directly or indirectly, from a reasoned agreement or
interchange among citizens. To be sure, such a demonstration serves a
justificatory role.16 But it does not show that the institutions and
practices take their rationale from the idea of a reasoned interchange.
And this is essential to a full contractarian understanding. Recall that I
began by referring to the importance, surprising to foreigners, of the
American Constitution in political thought, and to the idea that it
defines a new form of political practice, in which legitimacy derives from
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the will of "We, the People." By interpreting the Constitution as the
outcome of a reasoned interchange among Americans, we connect the
fact of the Constitution to the way in which the invocation of popular will
yields political legitimacy.
Such an interpretation requires both an actual and an ideal ground.
The actual ground comprises the adoption, judicial interpretation, and
amendment of the American Constitution. The ideal ground is a
unanimous rational agreement on the fundamental terms of political
association. We ask whether the former may be interpreted as a
reasonable approximation to the latter, and so whether it may be taken
as the constitutive expression of popular will.17 I can not, of course,
carry out this enquiry here. I can only suggest the sort of argument that,
if successful, would show why the American Constitution might be
supposed to give legitimacy to the workings of the American political
and legal systems, by expressing the rational will, not only of those who
participated in its formation and adoption, but of their fellows and
descendants.
9. Suppose then that we find an actual agreement, concluded in
circumstances that, while no doubt falling far short of those that would
permit a fully reasoned interchange on a fair basis among all the
members of a society, may nevertheless be seen as intended to realize a
practicable and reasonable approximation to such an interchange—or,
perhaps more realistically, may be seen as making possible an inter
change among a limited number of persons, the outcome of which might
approximate to the outcome of a fair universal interchange. We think of
the agreement as concluded by persons who take themselves to be
representing, to the best of their ability, the members of their society,
and to be seeking the terms that those members would find reasonable to
accept. So that if the agreement begins "We, the People," we find the
claim made in those words credible. And if the agreement continues by
enumerating a set of objectives, the first being "to form a more perfect
union," we may understand the agreement as speaking to the primary
question of public ordering, so that it represents itself as the expression
of the people's will about how their will shall be defined.
But these words may be expressions of pious sentiment—or even
impious, uttered to mislead. They contain no guarantee that what
follows them will express the people's will. Indeed, we may consider it
unreasonable to suppose that any procedure of representation can
guarantee an outcome approximating to that of a fair universal reasoned
interchange. And we must expect any actual attempt at representation
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to be limited by both the circumstances and the understandings of its
time. The framers of the American Constitution deliberated from the
fixed existence of the distinct states and their established forms of
government; they accommodated the historical reality of black slavery,
and even where slavery did not exist, they could not be said to have
represented free blacks. Nor of course did they represent women. But,
although we should be concerned with the circumstances that limit the
scope of the deliberations through which a constitution is adopted, we
may find that, over time, their biasing effect on a fair and free
interchange is offset by the actual political and legal practices that stem
from the adoption of a constitution. We should look at the political and
judicial institutions and their decisions, andask if, overtime, they may
be interpretedas the reasonable workings of a society aiming at mutual
advantage and equal respectamong its members. That is, we should ask
if the political practice created by an actual constitution is best
understood as an endeavorto satisfy the standard set by our ideal of a
reasoned interchange. Insofar as the American Constitution may be so
understood, we may suppose that if it bound those who concluded it as
their actual agreement, it may have come to bind theircontemporaries
and posterity because they may seeit asconcluded on their behalf.They
may treat the agreement of the Founders as if it were their own.
But if the Constitution is to be seen as the expression of posterity's
will, then that will must be involved more directly than through
interpretation of the agreement of the Founders. I noted earlier that
Rawls speaks of a group of persons deciding "once and for all what is to
count among them as just and unjust." But no human agreement can
establish the conditions of mutual advantage andequal respect onceand
for all. The development of our moral, political, and economic under
standing, and of our technological capacities to shape our environment,
calls for continuing accommodation. Thus if the Constitution is to
remain congruent with a reasoned interchange for posterity, posterity
must be able to adapt it to theiraltered understandings and powers. An
agreement, to be truly ongoing, must be amendable, and amendableby
a procedure that endeavors, to the fullest extent possible, to yield an
outcome that might approximate to that of a fair universal rational
interchange. Thus the process of amendment, like the process of
adoption, must aspire to the status of deliberative politics.
The American Constitution was declared in effect on March 4, 1789.
Speaking now from my foreign perspective, it seems to me that the best
two hundredth birthday present that Americanscould give their Consti
tution would be to devise a more determinate procedure for amend-
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ment. Whatever the merits of the failed Equal Rights Amendment, the
procedure for ratification, with states ratifying and then seeking to
deratify, with Congress setting a five year period and then, when the
amendment remained unratified, extending the period to ten years, is a
failure from the standpoint of deliberative politics. Although the consti
tutional ideal must be unanimity—an agreement fair and beneficial to
all, so acceptable by all—yet in the real world, a unanimist procedure
invites a descent from the deliberative to the purely strategic, as each
wields his individual veto. What must be sought, and what is in
principle sought by the requirement of concurrent two-thirds majorities
in Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the States, is consensus.
What the amending procedure fails adequately to recognize, as the
attempted ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment showed so
clearly, is that consensus requires simultaneity—that Congress and the
State should, in one period of time, accept the amendment. Even five
years is here too long. The Equal Rights Amendment did not secure that
consensus; had it been adopted by a controverted procedure that
avoided true consensus, much harm would have been done to the
constitutional ideal.
10. But the failed Equal Rights Amendment may itself be situated as
part of an historical development of constitutional understanding that
lends itself to a contractarian account. The more substantive amend
ments to the Constitution—the Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction
Amendments, the amendments relating to suffrage—together with the
more significant interpretative activity of the Supreme Court, may be
seen as responses to recognized lacunae in the constitutional text, as
judged in the light of evolved understandings and developed powers,
and from the perspective of mutual advantage and equal respect. The
failed Equal Rights Amendment was itself such a response, but one that
ran aground on the apparently unresolved task of finding a judicial
language that affirms sexual equality as it affirms racial equality, without
presuming that legal acceptance or rejection of sexual categories must
correspond to that of racial categories. Put very bluntly, there is yet no
consensus on how to define the terms of civic friendship between men
and women.
On a contractarian interpretation, the Constitution sets Americans
an ongoing task. The canonical status claimed for its text requires that it
be both expressive and constitutive of popular will. But insofar as
popular will could be fully embodied only in the outcome of a fair
reasoned interchange among all the members of the polity, a permanent
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tension exists between the actual text and the ideal text that would be
such an outcome, could it be realized. To the extent that the historical
process of interpreting and amending the Constitution is responsive to
this tension, the fallible text is shown to be perfectible, and so to
constitute, in the second-best circumstances of real politics, the standard
of legitimate authority. But the responsivenessof the historical processis
a matter of actual respondings by political actors. The canon is never
closed; the legitimacy of the Constitution is always subject to the
legitimating activity of relating it to the ideal standard of a deliberative
politics.
And so I return to Michelman's starting point: "In American
constitutional argument the premise is standard, if often tacit, that all
legitimate authority, hence all law, is ultimately traceable to a popular
will." (M.) How shall we understand that will? My answer has been
that we shall understand it as an agreement among the people, to
overcome the failure endemic in human interaction, even when that
interaction satisfies the standard of strategic rationality. We see the end
for restructuring that interaction—to form, then, "a more perfect
Union." That restructuring, I have argued, requires the establishment
of justice. And we may take the other objectives in the Preamble to the
American Constitution as abstract specifications of the main forms of
public good—domestic tranquility, common defence, general welfare—
concluding with "the blessings of liberty" to be secured to the citizens
and their posterity. In this latter phrase, we may find the idea of a
community in which each freely pursues her own good in a manner
compatible with being welcome as a participant in the Union that the
constitution establishes.
11. My conclusion is that, strange as it may initially seem to the
foreigner, Americans are right to think that their Constitution defines a
new form of political practice. For it is the first, and I believe arguably
the most successful document to be plausibly represented as an ex
pression of popular will determining what shall and shall not be
expressive of that will. More than any other constitution, it has come to
be accepted as the public expression of mutual agreement on the just
powers of government. To be sure, we may expect to find, in any
democratic polity, some recognition that the powers of government are
legitimate because they are established and limited by "We, the
People." The political practice codified in the Constitution has become
the democratic norm, implicit in societies that lack the constitutional
tradition that would make it explicit. And since the Constitution is the
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pioneering attempt to define that practice, we might find, in some
democratic polities, laws and institutions that fit better as possible
outcomes of a fair universal rational interchange than those of America.
But such comparative questions are not my concern. For political
thought, understanding the American Constitution, asking for the
rationale of its text, reveals what we mean by constituting democracy.
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res, they nevertheless need to have political and legal institutions and practices in place.
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